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LOOSE LIPS COULD SAVE SHIPS 
By Lieutenant Joe Hanacek, U.S. Navy 
L 
oak at this, sir,'' calls out Petty Of-
ficer First Class Lin, an analyst 
for the People's Liberation Army 
Navy's 324th cyber intelligence unit. "A 
USS Lake Champlain sailor just tweeted 
a complaint that their port call to Darwin, 
Australia, is delayed. He's upset he's had 
to pay a hotel cancellation fee." 
"Excellent. Lin; update the tracker," , 
Lieutenant Shen replies, looking at a • 
large-screen display of the South Pacific. 
For years, the 324th has been tracking 
U.S. ships and aircraft and monitoring 
the activities of Department of Defense 
(DoD) personnel ashore, providing their 
intelligence community with critical in-
formation to be somehow exploited. 
''Hold on!" calls a voice from the 
other side of the room. "I've got Face-
book posts from a wife bragging about 
her Tasmanian vacation; she says she's 
watching her husband's ship pull into 
Hobart. And an Instagram page seems 
to be showing the ship live in the Solo-
mon Islands!" 
"Where are these reports coming 
from? Are any of them correct? You need 
lo gel this sorted out immediately!" Lieu-
tenant Shen's shock quickly turns to dis-
may. The admiralty already had vectored 
assets to search for ships based on his 
earlier reports. 
Realizing his unit lacks the resources 
to sort through this mess, he sighs, calls 
up HQ, and begins to explain that all 
morning reports have been downgraded 
to confidence level 0. 
The next day in Darwin, a young Lake 
Champlain sailor checks into his hotel 
while, 400 miles away in Perth, a Chi-
nese electronic warfare signal collection 
team angrily loads up their nondescript 
white van, annoyed at the all-night drive 
ahead if they hope to get anything from 
the ship before it leaves port. 
What went wrong for Lieutenant 
Shen? Where did all the false re-
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ports come from? The answer is that 
DoD finally adopted a military decep-
tion (MilDec) campaign that put the old 
chestnuts about loose lips and purple 
dragons in the history books for good. 
That campaign? Operation Overload. 
Operation Overload is exactly what 
it sounds like: Put so much false infor-
mation into the environment that when a 
real operational security breach occurs, 
there is no good way for a potential ad-
versary to identify and exploit it. 
The first step in adopting Operation 
Overload is to accept that the spilling of 
any secret is not so much a matter of if 
as it is 11"he11. In the past, targeting. col-
lecting, transmitting, and processing in-
telligence data could take hours, days, 
or weeks. This lag meant OpSec didn't 
have to be perfect; it just had to delay 
the inevitable long enough for adversary 
intelligence efforts to go stale. Today, 
the collection of actionable intelligence 
often can be reduced to minutes or even 
seconds, thanks to the interconnected-
ness of global databases, advances in 
computer processing and artificial intel-
ligence, and humans' continuing procliv-
ity for lapses in judgment when it comes 
to protecting potentially sensitive infor-
mation. Operation Overload ensures crit-
ical information can hide in plain sight 
amid a storm of misinformation. Here's 
how it might work: 
Mi!Dec should be decentralized. Cer-
tainly it \\Ould be \'aluable to have Cy• 
ber Command work with the intelligence 
community to spin calculated narratives 
to mask real•world activities and pro-
mote false ones. But it \\Ould be fool-
ish to assume adversary forces would 
not be able to track this information to 
the source. 
Instead, unit commanders and their as-
signed information operations profession-
als should work with their commands so 
the entire DoD community treats their 
everyday online activities-from commu-
nity message boards to online dating- as 
an opportunity to confuse the enemy's in-
telligence picture. 
Operation Overload should not be-
come so specific that it limits its own 
potential. For example, when a ship is 
giving tours to civilians in a foreign 
port, there is a high probability for-
eign national intelligence officers may 
be in the crowd, recording conversa-
tions, images, and even electronic sig-
nals that may be of use for their ana-
lysts. During this time, why not discuss 
a new air-defense system with capabili-
ties many times more effective than any-
thing DoD actually fields? Why not "ac-
e identally" mention a false Achilles hee I 
an adversary might want to exploit? To-
gether, these little snares cou Id cost ad-
versaries countless hours and invaluable 
research and development funds chasing 
wild geese. 
During World War II, German and 
Japanese overconfidence in their in-
formation security and underestima-
tion of Allied cryptology proved fatal. 
For the United States to make similar 
mistakes in the 21st century would be 
tragic. To continue using obsolete oper-
ational security practices when simple 
MilDec solutions are available would be 
inexcusable. 
• LIEUTENANT HANACEK is a surface warfare 
officer currently pursuing a degree in systems 
engineering analysis at the Naval Postgraduate 
School He has previously served on board the 
USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) and USS Jackson 
(LC5-6). 
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